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Paul Polzin has been chosen director of 
the University of Montana’s Bureau of 
Business and Economic Research.
Polzin, who assumed his new duties 
May 1, is a management professor who 
has been a research associate with the 
Bureau since 1968 and its director of 
economic forecasting since 1983. He 
replaces Maxine Johnson, who retired as 
Bureau director Feb. 5.
Polzin specializes in regional economics 
and applied econometrics. He was a 
consulting research economist with the 
U.S. Forest Service from 1972 to 1977 
and continues to work closely with that 
agency on issues relating to natural 
resources and the economy.
He earned a doctorate and a master’s 
degree in economics at Michigan State 
University in 1968 and in 1964 received a 
bachelor’s in that field at The University 
of Michigan.
A fifteen-person committee made up of 
UM, state and local government, and 
private industry representatives chose 
Polzin Bureau director. He was one of 
three finalists in a national search.
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Over forty years have passed since 
Congress gave the Forest Service specific 
guidelines fo r  considering community 
stability in setting its policies. Federal 
officials obviously recognized that a 
change in the availability o f  federal timber 
could seriously impact those rural areas 
whose economies are based primarily on 
the wood products industry. Western 
Montana is certainly an example o f a 
timber-dependent region.
While the Forest Service must consider 
the issue o f community stability, Congress 
has never defined its meaning. What 
factors comprise community stability? How 
are they measured? Forest Service officials 
are still wrestling with this issue. Forest 
Service critics complicate the matter by 
demanding changes in Forest Service 
policies or practices, changes that could 
affect community stability.
As a result, the topic o f  community 
stability remains a vexing issue. How can 
the Forest Service respond to the needs o f  
the timber industry and the public
pressures o f  environmentalists, while at the 
same time wisely managing the federal 
forests and ensuring stability in those 
communities who depend on the timber 
industry as a major source o f  jobs? Con 
Schallau, a respected Forest Service 
economist, has been studying the issue fo r  
several years. This article, an update on 
the evolution o f  the community stability 
issue, is based on a presentation he made 
in November 1987 to the National 
Conference on Community Stability in 
Forest-Based Economies, held in Portland.
Earlier this year, I had theopportunity to discuss community 
stability. The title assigned to me was 
“Community Stability—Orthodoxy vs. 
Reality.” It was “mission impossible,” 
because, despite all the writing and 
rhetoric, there is no consensus 
regarding the issue of community 
stability. Had I chosen a title, it 
would have been “Community 
Stability—in Reality, There Is No 
Orthodoxy.”
Others have described the lack of 
consensus regarding the issue of 
community stability. In December 
1986, for example, High Country 
News featured an article by George 
Sibley about the Shelton (Washington) 
Cooperative Sustained Yield Unit. 
When the Shelton Unit was created in 
1946, the Simpson Timber Company 
was given exclusive harvesting rights 
for 100 years to 113,000 acres of 
virgin Douglas-fir and hemlock timber 
on the Olympic National Forest. In 
exchange, Simpson had to commit 
some of its remaining old growth 
plus cutover lands — 237,000 acres 
total—to sustained-yield management 
to help stabilize employment in the 
communities of Shelton and 
McCleary, Washington.
In his article, “The America That 
Did Not Happen,” Sibley noted:
... “stabilization” is another one 
of those tricky words—a word 
that, like Humpty-Dumpty said 
to Alice, “means just what I 
choose it to mean—neither more 
nor less.” Any effort to derive an 
operational definition of 
“stabilization” out of the 
agreement leads one to the 
conclusion that the word didn’t 
mean very much at all to either 
Simpson, the Forest Service or 
the people of the region.
Although I agree with Sibley that 
stabilization can be interpreted in 
many ways, I do not agree that the
word did not mean very much. The 
Great Depression was fresh in the 
minds of the cosigners when the 
Shelton Unit was established in 1946. 
Furthermore, it was common 
knowledge that Simpson, like other 
private forest landowners in the Puget 
Sound area, was about to run out of 
mature timber. One did not have to 
use much imagination to know what 
could happen to the Shelton and 
McCleary economies if timber 
harvesting from public forest land was 
not accelerated.
Today, the future of many other 
timber-dependent communities in the 
nonmetropolitan West resembles the 
situation facing Shelton, Washington, 
after World War II. Short of 
unprecedented success in achieving 
economic diversification, communities 
will experience hard times. Unless, of 
course, additional timber supplies 
become available. This is why the 
subject of community stability— 
whatever it means—has attracted so 
much attention.
Community stability cannot be 
understood without a sense of history. 
Consequently, I will begin with a 
review of how this concept evolved as 
a forestry issue.
Like a ship at sea, the concept of 
community stability has accumulated 
a lot o f barnacles and needs a new 
coat of paint. I will examine how we 
got here. Along the way I will pay 
particular attention to some nagging 
questions—barnacles and oxidized 
paint, so to speak—that impede 
progress.
To begin, let us consider where 
community stability fits into the 
hierarchy of USDA Forest Service 
goals. Of critical importance is the 
question, “Which is more important, 
sustained yield or community 
stability?”
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Which is more important, 
sustained yield or community 
stability?
The spectre of strandedcommunities in cutover areas of 
the Great Lake states attracted 
considerable attention (Sparhawk and 
Brush 1929). Nevertheless, Congress 
did not enact explicit direction to 
assure community stability until nearly 
fifty years after the National Forest 
System was established in 1897.
Because of abundant timber on 
private lands, demand for public 
stumpage was practically nonexistent 
until after World War II. The Forest 
Service could not affect the economic 
development of timber-dependent 
communities until it became a 
significant force in the market place 
for timber products; there was no 
need for Congress to intervene in the 
name of community stability.
Although community stability was 
not an early policy issue, sustained 
yield was. The fear of a future timber 
famine led to the concept of sustained 
yield (that is, to provide for “a 
continuous supply of timber”) 
contained in the 1897 Organic Act.
During the 1920s, industry 
representatives in the Pacific 
Northwest were concerned that 
premature harvesting on national 
forest lands would disrupt the market 
for their stumpage. Strangely enough, 
it was the oversupply of private timber 
that fostered sustained-yield 
management on public forests in the 
West.
The late David T. Mason is 
generally regarded as the granddaddy 
of the nation’s concept of sustained 
yield. Mason (1927) envisioned 
sustained-yield management as a 
means for reducing the availability of 
timber in the Pacific Northwest and 
thereby discouraging lumber 
companies in the South from moving 
to the West. In its barest form, 
Mason’s concept would have served to 
restrain entry into the forest products 
industry in the Pacific Northwest.
The Great Depression postponed 
official adoption of Mason’s sustained- 
yield concept. Although timber 
harvesting in the National Forest was
minimal, the sale of timber was 
temporarily halted to minimize 
problems for the private sector. 
Although the secretary of the interior 
was authorized in 1937 to establish 
sustained-yield units for the support of 
dependent communities and local 
industries, no units were established 
until after World War II (Dana 
1956).
Decisions regarding custodial 
activities—in contrast to timber 
harvesting—had little or no effect on 
the economic performance of timber- 
dependent communities.
Consequently, the National Forest 
System played a passive role as far as 
community stability was concerned.
This passive role ended with the 
passage of the Sustained Yield Forest 
Management Act of 1944 (53 Stat. 
132). This act authorized the 
secretaries of agriculture and the 
interior to establish either (1) 
cooperative sustained-yield units 
requiring both public and private 
forest land, or (2) federal sustained- 
yield units consisting only of federal 
land to “promote the stability of 
forest industries, of employment, of 
communities and taxable forest 
wealth, through continuous supplies of 
timber.” The Shelton cooperative unit 
on the Olympic National Forest and 
five federal units elsewhere in the 
West resulted from this act. Of the 
latter, only the Lakeview (in Oregon), 
Big Valley (in California), and the 
Grays Harbor (in Washington) remain 
active.
No cooperative units or federal 
sustained-yield units were established 
by the Department of the Interior. In 
1946 and 1947, however, the secretary 
established twelve marketing areas 
consisting of Oregon and California 
(O&C) lands in western Oregon, “the 
product of which should logically go 
to definite marketing areas” (Dana 
1956). These marketing areas were 
abolished in April 1959.
The establishment of the O&C 
master units and the cooperative and 
federal sustained-yield units comprised 
of national forest lands represents the 
high water mark as far as community 
stability policies are concerned. In the
ensuing twenty to twenty-five years, 
concern for community stability 
waned. The Forest Service shifted its 
rationale for sustained yield from 
community stability to “conservation 
of resources to help meet the wants of 
future generations” (Josephson 1976).
As Waggener (1977) predicted, the 
enactment of the National Forest 
Management Act (NFMA) of 1976 
sparked renewed interest in the issue 
of community stability. For example, 
the greatest interest expressed in 
public responses to draft regulations, 
developed pursuant to the NFMA, 
concerned proposed changes in 
nondeclining even-flow timber harvest 
policy. More recently, below-cost 
timber sales have been rationalized in 
the name of community stability. 
Whether this renewed interest will 
help timber-dependent communities in 
the Pacific Northwest achieve 
economic stability remains to be seen, 
however.
Despite a lack of consensus, I 
believe most observers can grasp how 
community stability, like sustained 
yield, can be a means to achieving 
satisfaction and well-being. But these 
policies may be mutually exclusive. If 
so, which is more important? Congress 
is responsible for the answer to this 
question, but to date, unfortunately, 
its actions have done more to 
obfuscate than to clarify the question 
(Schallau and Alston 1987).
In the meantime, the Forest Service 
has, at least implicitly, provided its 
own ranking of the community 
stability and sustained-yield goals. 
Acting to prevent the possibility of a 
shortfall in timber production that 
had been forecast in the Douglas-fir 
Supply Study (USDA Forest Service 
1969), the Forest Service issued an 
emergency directive that spelled out 
the now famous nondeclining even- 
flow policy (USDA Forest Service 
1973).
Implementing the nondeclining cut 
policy caused an immediate reduction 
in the programmed harvests from the 
national forests in the Pacific 
Northwest. The former policy would 
have postponed a significant shortfall 
in the allowable cut for ninety to 120
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years. It could be argued that, had 
the Forest Service been more 
committed to economic stability, they 
would have adopted an alternative 
scenario and thereby postponed the 
decline to allow the communities 
sufficient time to adjust. The choice 
of going with the nondeclining even- 
flow policy may imply that the Forest 
Service ranks sustained yield ahead of 
community stability. Or does it? It all 
depends on the answer to the next 
question.
How is community stability 
achieved?
The Code of Federal Regulations describes the “Disposal of national 
forest timber according to 
management plans.” This code states 
that management plans shall “be 
based on the principle of sustained 
yield . . . ” and “provide . . .  an even 
flow of national forest timber in order 
to facilitate the stabilization of 
communities and of opportunities for 
employment.” This code suggests that 
community stability will be achieved 
by an even-flow timber harvesting 
policy.
I find it hard to accept the notion 
that a single, uniformly applied 
scenario for scheduling timber 
harvesting will promote economic 
stability for all timber-dependent 
communities. To do so presumes that 
all communities have the same 
economic future. A more logical 
policy would recognize the possibility 
that some communities are beyond 
help; some communities do not need 
help; and others might benefit from a 
departure scenario. I do not see how 
we can fashion a reasonable policy 
without a way to identify communities 
that might benefit from a departure 
scenario. In the interest of finding a 
community stability indicator, I would 
like to share my “economic coercion” 
hypothesis.
Community stability exists if all the 
following questions can be answered 
with a “yes":
• Did the majority of persons 
moving to a community within 
the last decade perceive that by
doing so they were able to 
maintain their permanent 
income?1
• Did the majority of persons 
moving from a community within 
the last decade perceive that by 
doing so they were able to 
maintain their permanent 
income?
• Do the majority of persons 
choosing to remain in a 
community perceive that by 
doing so they are able to 
maintain their permanent 
income?
A majority of “no” answers would, I 
hypothesize, indicate that all is not 
well in Timber Town, USA.
Although I have no theoretical 
proof, I do have anecdotal evidence 
that my hypothesis might help 
determine if a community is stable. 
For example, on April 1, 1987, the 
Corvallis, Oregon Gazette Times 
carried the following statement by 
Dale Romrell (1987): “...I would like 
to see Corvallis prosper enough so 
someday I could sell my house easily.” 
Furthermore, I asked my barber if he 
sympathized with Romrell. He did, 
and added that he would also like to 
be able to sell his business. He did 
not want to be the last guy out of 
town.
Has community stability 
acquired economic standing?
Phyllis Austin, writing in theAugust 1987 issue of Forest Watch 
states that, “The typical forest 
industry CEO isn’t worried about 
harvesting trees but about policy and 
finance issues....” She goes on to 
decry corporate raiders who “have 
‘accelerated harvest on their minds’ to 
increase profits, at the expense of the 
forest.”
Ironically, the August 1987 issue of 
the Journal o f  Forestry featured 
articles about “below-cost” timber 
sales. If you have been following this
1According to Pearce (1983), permanent income 
is “the average income that the individual or 
household expects to receive over a period of 
years."
issue, you know that the Forest Service 
has been criticized for not recovering 
all costs associated with its timber 
sales program. So what should be 
done—does the Forest Service accept 
or reject the emphasis on the bottom 
line? Needless to say, critics cannot 
have it both ways!
As we all know, Congress rejected 
the bottom line mentality when it 
intervened and created the National 
Forest System to assure a perpetual 
supply of timber. As a result, we have 
a public goods-and-services-producing 
institution that defies the fundamental 
assumptions of mainstream economic 
analysis. Furthermore most policy 
issues—including community 
stability—have resulted because 
Congress has not put limits on how 
far the Forest Service can deviate 
from the bottom-line mentality of the 
market place.
Mainstream economic theory (that 
is, neoclassical theory) presumes that 
maximization of profits is the 
fundamental criterion. Since profit­
making, per se, is not the objective of 
the National Forest System, the 
existence of the National Forest 
System cannot be rationalized by 
conventional theory. On the contrary, 
the Sagebrush Rebellion was, in part, 
the brain child of economists who 
used neoclassical economics to justify 
privatizing the National Forest 
System.
So where does community stability 
fit in? Does it have economic 
standing? In its strictest form, 
conventional theory assumes a market 
economy with perfect competition 
between buyers and sellers. That is, 
no trader can influence prices, and 
excess profits will not persist because 
new firms are free to enter the 
industry. In fact, however, private 
firms cannot enter the log-supplying 
business throughout much of the West 
because Uncle Sam holds most of the 
remaining inventory.
Neoclassical theory also assumes 
that market forces will maintain full 
employment. Persistent 
unemployment, if it exists at all, is 
assumed to be voluntary. Instability in 
the marketplace will be of short
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duration and will be self-correcting.
As far as conventional economic 
theory is concerned, therefore, 
community stability is an irrelevant 
issue.
In fact, labor and capital are not 
perfectly mobile. Furthermore, 
voluntary unemployment is not 
commonplace, and labor and capital 
are often frozen in place. A 
community stability policy—however 
described—may not be necessary, but 
the question of how to achieve 
economic stability has standing in 
some economic circles. How else do 
you explain the development of 
Keynesian economics?
Let us not toss out the baby with 
the bath water. Just because the 
fundamental assumptions of 
mainstream economic theory do not 
represent reality is no reason to ignore 
the usefulness of the tools of economic 
analysis. Let me illustrate by 
considering the following question.
Is the USDA Forest Service 
subsidizing the forest products 
industry?
An increasing number of processors in the West depend on national 
forests for all of their timber. In such 
instances, the Forest Service is a 
monopolist. Economic theory says that 
a monopolist maximizes profits by 
supplying less product than it would 
have to in a competitive market. 
Restricting supply would result in 
higher prices and, consequently, 
higher profits—all to the detriment of 
society at large.
Hagenstein and others (1987) 
analyzed the timber harvesting policies 
of the Forest Service in the Pacific 
Northwest and found the Forest 
Service behaving like a monopolist. 
They compared annual timber harvest 
and prices for current nondeclining 
even-flow (“baseline”) policies with 
those that would be obtained if a 
truly competitive market for logs 
existed. They found that
projected prices for stumpage in 
constant dollars on the Westside 
(western Washington and 
Oregon) for the 1980s were 81
percent below the baseline 
forecast, and those on the 
Eastside (eastern Washington and 
Oregon and all of Idaho) were 72 
percent lower.
Furthermore, they estimated that if 
current public timber-harvest policies 
prevail during the 1980s and 1990s, 
about $4 billion of income annually 
will be shifted from individual 
consumers of forest products and the 
timber-processing industry to public 
and other timber owners in the 
Northwest.
Critics of the below-cost timber sale 
policies have accused the Forest 
Service of subsidizing the forest 
products industry in the name of 
community stability (Wilkinson 1985). 
By themselves, individual below-cost 
sales might well be described as a 
subsidy. Considered in a global sense, 
however, the selling of “cheap” 
stumpage might represent implicit 
compensation to the processing 
industry for the monopoly rents 
earned elsewhere by the Forest 
Service.
What will take the place of the 
forest products industry?
The nation’s leaders are struggling to find ways to reenergize our 
economy. The challenge is 
particularly acute for small towns and 
rural areas where forest resources are 
abundant, for example, in the Pacific 
Northwest. In the seven years between 
1978 and 1985, Oregon’s per capita 
income slipped from better than the 
national average to 91 percent of the 
national average —its lowest in fifty- 
five years—and the gap is widening.2
Washington’s economy is faring 
better, thanks mainly to the U. S. 
defense buildup during the last seven 
years, but a slowdown in defense 
spending would damage the economy 
considerably. Besides, the economic
2According to J. Cartright, losing ground is the 
growing gap between Oregon and national 
income. Unpublished staff report to the foint 
Legislative Committee on Trade and 
Development. 1986. Salem, OR.
plight of rural areas in Washington 
resembles that of their counterparts in 
Oregon (Coit 1987).
Traditionally, most new jobs are 
created by small, usually existing 
businesses. Few communities stand a 
chance of attracting a new, large 
employer. Consequently, retention of 
existing firms is of prime importance. 
Nevertheless, diversification is an 
appropriate long-term goal for some 
timber-dependent communities. But 
this process is slow and fraught with 
pitfalls and dependent on a viable 
public and private infrastructure. 
Traditionally, the infrastructure has 
been supported by timber.
Tourism and recreation are often 
touted as the solution to ailing forest- 
resource-based communities. They 
may be the solution, but only in 
isolated situations where four-season 
facilities and entertainment can be 
provided. Lake Tahoe, Nevada/ 
California; Sun Valley, Idaho; and 
Bend, Oregon are familiar examples. 
Otherwise, tourism and recreation are 
adjuncts to existing industries that 
provide year-round employment.
A remote, stand-alone resort 
complex that attracts seasonal use 
may generate substantial cash flow 
and still not bolster the surrounding 
economy. Rajender and others (1967) 
encountered this phenomenon in their 
study of the economy of Teton 
County, Wyoming. Referring to the 
“leakage” from the county, they point 
out that
there is a complicating factor in 
that many of the summer 
residents are seasonal workers 
who have a permanent residence 
elsewhere. These people are 
inclined to spend relatively little 
money during their residence in 
the county; the bulk of their 
earnings goes into expenditures at 
their regular place of residence.
In fact, they observed that, because 
of this leakage of funds, the multiplier 
effect actually declined over a five- 
year period.
Closer to home, we simulated the 
job loss associated with the projected 
shortfall in timber harvesting from
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public and private forest lands in 
western Oregon (Olson, Schallau and 
Maki 1988). We examined the 
cumulative employment effects of a 
hypothetical 20 percent reduction in 
harvesting from the national forests 
and the shortfall in harvesting from 
forest industry lands projected by 
Beuter and others (1976).
We used growth rates provided by 
the U.S. Department of Commerce 
for each of the seventy-five industries 
in our representation of the Oregon 
economy. We also allowed for 
technological changes in all industries 
including the forest products industry.
Our simulation showed that the 
economy of western Oregon will 
continue to grow in spite of a shortfall 
in timber harvesting. But the 
difference — the impact —between the 
baseline scenario and the scenario 
with the shortfall is substantial. 
Furthermore, our simulation suggests 
that despite continued growth of all 
nontimber-related industries— 
agriculture, high-tech, tourism, 
transportation, wholesale and retail 
trade —the state’s economy will need 
an extraordinary and sustained shot in 
the arm to overcome the effects of the 
shortfall in timber harvesting.
Does the forest products 
industry matter?
Thirty years ago, John Kenneth Galbraith (1958) had this to say 
about our affluent society:
...The greatest prospect that we 
face —indeed what must now be 
counted one of the central 
economic goals of our society—is 
to eliminate toil as a required 
economic institution. This is not 
a utopian vision. We are already 
well on the way. Only an 
extraordinary elaborate exercise 
in social camouflage has kept us 
from seeing what has been 
happening.
Within a decade, many observers 
began to share Galbraith’s concern.
For instance, in 1973, Daniel Bell 
popularized the notion that the 
United States should shed the sunset
industries of the past—that is, heavy 
industries—and welcome the sunrise 
sectors of the future, namely services 
and high tech. We had become a 
“post-industrial” society and the 
sooner we recognized this 
metamorphosis, the better off we 
would be!
The notion of the post-industrial 
society is embraced by those in high 
places. In his 1985 annual report on 
trade agreements programs, President 
Reagan (1985) had this to say:
The move from an industrial 
society toward a “post-industrial” 
service economy has been one of 
the greatest changes to affect the 
developed world since the 
Industrial Revolution. The 
progression of an economy such 
as America’s from agriculture to 
manufacturing to services is a 
natural change.
According to a spokesperson for the 
New York Stock Exchange (Seligman 
1987), “a strong manufacturing sector 
is not a requisite for a prosperous 
economy.” Then there is Malcolm 
Forbes who stated (Cohen and Zysman 
1987):
Instead of ringing in the decline 
of our economic power, a service- 
driven economy signals the most 
advanced stage of economic 
development . . . .  Instead of 
following the Pied Piper of 
“reindustrialization,” the U.S. 
should be concentrating its efforts 
on strengthening its services.
Events of the recent past —the 
recession of 1981 and 1982, declining 
industrial productivity, trade and 
budget deficits, and of course, the 
stock market crash of this past 
October—have had a sobering effect. 
We have become more cautious and 
introspective as Japan continues to 
assert its economic power.
Many industrial observers are 
expressing concern about the growing 
tendency toward offshore 
manufacturing—the hollowing of our 
economy. The fear is that offshore 
manufacturing will result in the loss 
o f onshore control (Cohen and
Zysman 1987). The fact that the 
Japanese are trying desperately to 
retain their manufacturing capability 
to avoid the mistakes that caused 
industrial decline in the United States 
should, according to some business 
analysts, stir us into action (Borrus 
and Holstein 1987).
In a recent essay, “Road from 
Constantinople,” Sudia (1987) 
described Wallerstein’s world system 
hypothesis. This hypothesis would 
have increasing amounts of U.S. 
capital seeking more lucrative ventures 
in foreign capitals. If this process has 
merit, New York will relinquish its 
role as the world’s financial capital by 
the middle of the next century. Sudia 
thinks the United States has a chance 
to survive challenges to its economic 
authority, but “if we pursue the beef 
and citrus markets in Japan—if U.S. 
capital goes to Japan—we will be just 
another country on the road from 
Constantinople. ”
Perhaps the most forceful challenge 
to the legitimacy of the concept of the 
post-industrial economy has been 
provided by Stephen S. Cohen and 
John Zysman, two academicians at the 
University of California at Berkeley’s 
Roundtable on the International 
Economy (BRIE). They claim that we 
do not now have a post-industrial 
economy, and we had better not 
acquire one. In their recent book, 
Manufacturing Matters: the Myth of 
the Post-industrial Economy, Cohen 
and Zysman (1987) state
Rather than an element and sign 
of economic development, much 
of the growth of service 
employment may be a way of 
spreading around economic 
stagnation, as we all take in each 
other’s linen for wash or, at least, 
each other’s relatives for care.
Any student of economic growth 
theory will appreciate Cohen and 
Zysman’s emphasis on productivity 
and how strongly linked it is to a 
nation’s standard of living: “America’s 
preeminent wealth and power is based 
on American productivity being 
higher than that elsewhere.” How can 
one logically presume that a shift to
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manufacturing will . . . determine how well the forest 
products industry and dependent communities prosper.
services—where growth in productivity 
has stagnated—will allow the United 
States to maintain its standard of 
living?
Cohen and Zysman’s basic premise 
is that the United States not only will 
suffer a decline in its standard of 
living but also will lose out as an 
economic power if it keeps losing key 
industries that foster the change and 
expansion of other industries:
...if we lose mastery and control 
of manufacturing, the high- 
paying service jobs that are 
directly linked to manufacturing 
will, in a few short rounds of 
product and process innovation, 
seem to wither away (only to 
spout up offshore, where the 
manufacturing went).
It is the high-value-added 
service roles tied directly to 
manufacturing (whether they are 
located in service or 
manufacturing categories) that we 
must hold and develop if we are 
to remain a powerful economy. It 
is not manufacturing jobs per se.
In brief, in order for the shift of 
employment to services to be 
developmental and not become a 
shift to poverty, we must 
maintain mastery and control of 
manufacturing production.
Conclusion
S o what does this have to do with community stability? Cohen and 
Zysman (1987) assert that many old- 
line industries have a transitional 
role —to promote the development of 
state-of-the-art equipment and more 
efficient production to meet foreign 
competition. In this regard, I believe 
the forest products industry and 
dependent communities can play a 
role.
The ability of the United States to 
compete well in foreign markets is on 
the national agenda. Policies 
influencing our nation’s industrial 
strength will be shaped by Congress. 
This does not mean that such policies 
will be created without regard for the 
role that individual industries play in 
maintaining our economic prowess.
In the future, how we as a nation 
regard the role of manufacturing will, 
to a considerable degree, determine 
how well the forest products industry 
and dependent communities prosper.
I believe that recognition of the 
serious challenge to U.S. 
competitiveness should have a bearing 
on how the community stability issue 
is resolved. I agree with Cohen and 
Zysman (1987) that we must “avoid 
the idiocies that result when we make 
domestic policy as if our internal 
choices had no consequences in 
international markets . . . [and] we 
must link domestic policy to 
international policy in a more positive 
way.”
In the same vein, I would add that 
we must avoid the idiocies that result 
when we disregard the cumulative 
economic effect of the policies of 
private forest landowners as if their 
contribution had no bearing on the 
future of dependent communities.
I believe we must avoid the idiocies 
that result when we disregard the 
monopoly profits earned by the Forest 
Service in the Pacific Northwest as if 
their existence had no bearing on the 
economic evaluation of below-cost 
timber sales.
Finally, I believe we must avoid the 
idiocies that result when we make 
community-stability policy as if our 
choices.had no consequences in 
regional and national markets. □
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The United States and Canada have the most extensive trade 
relationship in the world. But despite 
the unmatched flows of goods and 
services across the border, significant 
barriers to trade between the two 
countries remain. Negotiations toward 
a comprehensive bilateral free trade 
agreement (FTA) were initiated in 
May 1986, and concluded in October 
1987. President Reagan and Prime 
Minister Mulroney formally signed the 
agreement on January 2, 1988.
Neither country achieved all of its 
objectives in the negotiation. 
Nevertheless, the FTA is a remarkable 
document. Ratification would create 
the world’s largest free trade area, a 
continental market of 265 million 
people. Both the Reagan 
administration and the Mulroney 
government have hailed the FTA as a 
historic accomplishment in U.S.- 
Canada relations and a “win*win 
situation,” meaning the benefits to 
both countries outweigh the costs. 
Their optimism is predicated on the 
expectation of net increases in
economic growth and employment in 
both countries, enhanced security for 
investors, improved market access for 
exporters, lower prices for consumers 
and mitigation of trade disputes 
before they become costly.
The Agreement’s Provisions
The main features of the FTA deal with transborder transactions, 
national treatment, and the handling 
of trade disputes.
Transborder transactions
The most important elements of the 
agreement include the removal of 
tariffs, the lifting of certain 
quantitative and qualitative 
restrictions, and the easing of 
regulations on border crossings for 
business purposes.
Tariffs. The agreement calls for 
the elimination of all tariffs and 
establishes a staging process whereby 
certain tariffs would be removed 
immediately, others after five years, 
and the rest at the end of ten years.
Quantitative and qualitative 
restrictions. Quotas, embargoes and 
minimum price requirements to 
restrict trade will not be allowed, 
except in accordance with the rules of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) rules, which permit 
measures for health, safety, security, 
conservation and short supply. Export 
restrictions based on conservation 
needs may be taken, but they must 
provide for the sharing of the resource 
with the other party and must not 
create price discrimination by other 
means.
Exit, entry, and customs 
restrictions. Certain immigration laws 
and customs procedures inhibit 
business transactions. Investors and 
professional service providers, such as 
architects, engineers and consultants, 
have been held up at the border by 
red tape. Personnel from export firms 
have had trouble crossing the border 
to perform maintenance, warranty, 
and other after-sales services on 
commercial or industrial equipment. 
The FTA establishes a list o f qualified 
business persons who will be able to 
cross the border for temporary stays 
under special visa classification.
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National treatment
Important provisions of the FT A are 
based on the internationally 
recognized principle of national 
treatment, whereby foreign 
commercial entities are treated in a 
non-discriminating fashion, as if they 
were domestic firms.
Financial services. The agreement 
on financial services is a self-contained 
component of the FTA, to be 
administered by the U.S. Treasury 
Department. It removes essentially all 
existing discrimination faced by U.S. 
financial institutions operating in 
Canada, allows the flexibility to 
acquire Canadian financial services 
firms, and allows financial firms on 
both sides of the border to compete 
on a more equal basis.
Investment. The investment portion 
of the FTA provides reciprocal 
guarantees against discriminatory 
barriers and regulations that can 
threaten the security of transborder 
capital flows. United States investors 
wishing to directly purchase Canadian 
firms valued at less than $150 million 
in Canadian dollars will not require 
approval from Canadian investment 
screening authorities. Indirect 
acquisitions, involving Canadian 
subsidiaries of acquired foreign parent 
companies, will no longer be screened 
after a phase-out period.
Government procurement. The 
U.S. and Canadian governments apply 
various “buy national” preferences to 
favor domestic goods and services. 
These preferences inhibit competition 
from foreign producers. Under the 
FTA, suppliers of goods that are 
manufactured in the United States or 
Canada and which contain at least 50 
percent U.S. or Canadian content will 
be treated on an equal basis to 
suppliers of domestic goods for 
covered procurements.
Services. The Canada-U.S. FTA is 
the first international agreement 
governing trade and investment in 
services industries. The FTA commits 
both countries to work toward mutual 
recognition of licensing and 
certification requirements in areas not 
already covered by reciprocal 
agreements. Future requirements for
individuals providing services, such as 
accountants and engineers, will be 
based on competence, not nationality.
Standards. Product and labor 
standards sometimes inhibit bilateral 
trade. Notwithstanding legitimate 
public policy goals for which technical 
regulations and standards are 
maintained (e.g., to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health, to 
preserve the environment, and to 
protect security interests), some 
standards-related measures hinder 
trade unnecessarily. The FTA 
obligates both countries to harmonize 
federal-level standards to the greatest 
extent possible, and to promote the 
harmonization of private standards.
Dispute settlement
Fashioning an effective mechanism to 
settle trade disputes was a major 
Canadian objective in the 
negotiations. Most bilateral trade is 
conducted on friendly terms, so the 
new method of resolving disputes will 
probably affect a relatively small 
proportion of total bilateral exchange. 
Still, conflicts have arisen in recent 
years over goods of enormous value to 
one or both countries. Since 
frequently resorting to protective and 
retaliatory “trade remedies” can 
eliminate the benefits of free trade, a 
Canada-U.S. Trade Commission 
would be created to help avoid and 
mitigate such problems.
Countervail and antidumping 
actions. Each country will continue 
unilaterally to administer and enforce 
its countervailing duty and 
antidumping statutes. However, 
special binational dispute settlement 
panels can review whether final 
administrative decisions are 
appropriate under national laws. The 
FTA thus creates a binational 
mechanism that replaces judicial 
review of decisions taken by the U.S. 
International Trade Commission, the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, and 
their counterpart agencies in Canada. 
Panel decisions will be binding, so 
petitioners will no longer have 
recourse to national courts, such as 
the U.S. International Trade Court.
Safeguards. The FTA provides for
a safeguard system that parallels 
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 
1974—also known as the “escape 
clause” —to preserve the rights of 
workers and firms in both countries to 
gain relief from import-related injury. 
While the United States and Canada 
have not used safeguard actions 
against each other very often, the 
possibility of doing so reduces the 
certainty of market access. Rules on 
the use of safeguard actions need to 
be included in the FTA to facilitate 
corporate planning.
Unfinished business: non-tariff 
barriers
The FTA is not comprehensive; 
certain industries and specific items 
were either excluded from the agenda 
or dropped from the text at various 
stages of the negotiations. Some of the 
products not covered by the 
agreement, such as steel and lumber, 
are expected to be handled by 
separate negotiations (although these 
items may later fall under the purview 
of the dispute settlement mechanism). 
In other sectors, stiff and well- 
organized opposition to prospective 
features of the FTA compelled trade 
officials to explicitly exempt some 
types of trade and simply ignore 
others.
Many non-tariff measures are not 
covered by the FTA. Both national 
governments employ a variety of 
incentive and equalization programs 
that appear to give certain industries 
an advantage in some export markets. 
Proponents of a truly comprehensive 
trade agreement were also compelled, 
in the end, to acknowledge the 
political and administrative difficulties 
of fashioning an accord that would 
legally bind provinces and states 
without fomenting constitutional 
challenges.
Several policies at the national level 
can be construed as unfair trade 
practices. One example is building 
codes that may require a higher level 
of construction quality for imports. 
Another is transportation practices, 
which can entail direct subsidies to 
move certain products or indirect 
subsidies in the form of requirements
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that shipments in domestic waters 
must be made on domestic carriers. 
Another example, in Canada, is the 
use of state trading agencies such as 
the Canadian Wheat Board.
With one clear exception—the 
treatment of wine imported to 
Canada from the United States —the 
FTA does not extend into areas of 
provincial jurisdiction. It also does not 
appear to alter or nullify the various 
powers of state governments to 
regulate commerce within their 
boundaries. States maintain “Buy 
American” clauses in rules governing 
contract awards for some types of 
construction and maintenance 
projects. Other examples of non-tariff 
barriers that the FTA does not 
eliminate include: state and provincial 
farm support; special tax and public 
sector financial incentives; direct loans 
and loan guarantees to small and 
medium-sized businesses; state 
regulations restricting foreign 
ownership of insurance and banking 
firms, or farmland; and other 
promotional and support services 
provided to exporters.
Terms of abrogation
Either country can withdraw from the 
FTA after giving the other six months’ 
notice of intent. In addition, if an 
agreement on a new bilateral regime 
for trade remedies laws is not reached 
after the seven-year period specified in 
the dispute settlement provisions, 
either country could terminate the 
agreement. This feature provides a 
legal means of escape from obligations 
that do not lead to anticipated 
benefits (Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative 1988).
Gains from Trade 
in Theory
Economic theory and the experience (of western trading nations strongly 
indicate that the gains from freer 
trade outweigh the losses, usually 
referred to as the costs of adjustment. 
In general, trade liberalization leads 
to greater economic efficiency, 
productivity, and growth, which, in 
turn, generate increased employment 
and higher incomes and result in 
more stable prices and lower interest 
rates. Greater efficiencies are realized 
through specialization, larger 
production runs, and other economies 
of scale.
The reduction or elimination of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers lowers 
consumer prices, increases consumer 
choice, and raises the quality and 
availability of goods and services. 
Benefits to industry include market 
expansion, lower input costs, greater 
opportunities for product 
diversification, and lower risks to 
investors in export-oriented firms. In 
the long run, freer trade, because it 
appears to stimulate growth, can also 
lead to import substitution as small 
domestic firms seize opportunities to 
supply the larger companies engaged 
in trade.
All of these points apply to the 
United States and Canada. Closer 
analysis, mainly by Canadian 
economists, has yielded positive (if 
wide-ranging) calculations of net 
growth in Gross National Product 
(GNP) resulting from a bilateral free 
trade accord (Whaley 1985). The net 
effects of gradual but substantial 
tariff reductions appear modest but 
the benefits are nonetheless real: even 
a 1 or 2 percent rise in U.S. GNP 
translates into substantial employment 
benefits. In the U.S., each $1 billion 
in trade is associated with 
approximately 25,000 jobs (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 1986).
The gain for Canada is expected to 
be greater because small countries 
benefit the most—via economies of 
scale and market access—from closer 
integration with larger ones. Both 
countries should enjoy some benefit 
from trade diversion. Each country 
can save money by buying goods in
North America, goods that might 
otherwise have been purchased from 
overseas suppliers where tariffs would 
still apply (Wonnacott 1987).
Another significant benefit to both 
countries is the enhanced security of 
investments that would result from a 
formal trade agreement. This may be 
as important to Canada, in the long 
run, as gaining more secure access to 
U.S. markets for Canadian exports. 
United States firms are also more 
likely to expand their operations in 
Canada because the trade agreement 
substantially reduces the likelihood of 
any future discriminatory actions 
similar to the National Energy Policy 
and the restrictive practices of the 
Foreign Investment Review Agency in 
the 1970s. Since Canada ranks third 
as a source of direct foreign 
investment in the United States, and 
such investments have increased 
dramatically in recent years, the 
reciprocal security provided by the 
agreement is an important benefit to 
those sectors of the U.S. economy 
reliant on Canadian capital for 
expansion.
Estimates of the effects of bilateral 
free trade rest on assumptions about 
increased specialization, higher 
productivity, trends in the labor 
market and the realization of 
economies of scale in key sectors. 
These aggregate expectations are, in 
turn, based on the assumption that 
individual firms will behave in an 
economically rational manner if 
barriers to trade are removed. Thus, 
the gains from freer trade are 
predicated on business decisions that 
are perhaps more free from 
nationalistic and other non­
commercial motivations than can be 
reasonably expected. Free trade 
creates opportunities, but cannot 
guarantee that companies will seize 
them.
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Trade and Investment 
Patterns: Montana and 
Canada
A free trade agreement with Canada will have important 
effects, but the agreement will have a 
marginal effect on this country’s 
overall economic performance. 
Increased trade is no panacea for 
persistent, deeply-rooted economic 
problems. Montana —compared to 
other border states such as Michigan, 
Minnesota, and Washington and to 
high population and rapid growth 
states in the West like California, 
Texas, and Colorado —has a small 
material stake in Canadian trade. 
Montana’s geography and resource 
base are very similar to those of 
neighboring Canadian provinces. But 
lacking a comparable population, 
there are few obvious reasons for 
extensive trade to take place, 
especially in the raw and semi- 
processed commodities such as grain, 
coal, and lumber that all possess in 
abundance. The exceptions, however, 
are important.
The bulk of Montana’s trade with 
western Canada is in similar products: 
chemicals, cattle, fertilizers, drilling 
machinery, agricultural equipment, 
and some wood products travel both 
ways across the border. This trade 
resembles the bilateral pattern, where 
much of the $150 billion exchange is 
in similar goods and services. 
Comparative advantage applies to the 
movement of phosphates and non- 
metallic minerals north (that Montana 
can produce at relatively low cost) 
and in crude oil and natural gas 
transfers to the south (mainly from 
Alberta, which has large reserves of 
both). Trade in crude materials is still 
important, reflecting the dearth of 
processing facilities on either side of 
the border. Phosphate rock, for 
example, is shipped to Canada to be 
made into fertilizer; mineral 
concentrates are sent to Montana to 
be broken down into more refined 
products.
The balance of trade between 
Montana and the neighboring 
provinces seems lopsided in Canada’s 
favor. In 1986, Montana exported
approximately $89 million worth of 
commodities to Canada and imported 
$512 million (Office of Canada 1988). 
Most of the estimated $423 million 
“deficit” is a result of the relative 
economic power and export 
orientation of the western provinces 
and U.S.-Canada exchange rates. 
Regional balance of trade figures, like 
the more familiar national ones, do 
not show interest and dividend 
payments, service expenditures and 
tourism revenues flowing in both 
directions. So, the overall “balance of 
payments” could tip the scale toward 
transborder parity.
In addition, the best available 
statistics, which come from Canada, 
do not distinguish between goods 
shipped to and from Montana, and 
those transiting the state. More 
significantly, trade flow data cannot 
show the economic benefits of 
imports. Montana refineries, for 
example, rely upon Canadian crude 
for about one-third of their oil supply. 
Nearly three-fourths of Montana’s 
trade deficit with Canada is 
attributable to imports of this raw 
product to which value is added in 
the state.
Montana ranked seventh out of ten 
western states in terms of employment 
generated by Canadian direct 
investment. Canadian companies were 
responsible for $963 million worth of 
investment, directly employing over 
1,200 Montana workers in 1987 
(Office of Canada 1988). This 
proportion may be even greater now, 
as a number of recently established 
gold mining operations involve 
Canadian partners. Opportunities for 
joint ventures with U.S. firms, as well 
as the quality, quantity, and location 
of Montana’s precious metals, have 
drawn the most Canadian capital to 
the state. The real estate market is 
another area of concentrated 
investment activity by Canadians, 
particularly recreational properties in 
the Flathead Lake area and 
commercial properties in Billings. 
Although the agreement is unlikely to 
affect Canadian investors directly, the 
declining value of the U.S. dollar 
should accentuate the attractiveness of 
Montana’s property and mineral 
resources.
Politics of the Agreement
The easiest, but overly simplistic, way 
to assess the potential economic 
impacts of bilateral free trade is to 
assemble lists of “winners” and 
“losers.” According to most 
projections, the clear winners in the 
United States are large financial 
services firms, transnational 
corporations (mainly in the 
automotive, energy and 
manufacturing sectors), and 
consumers. The losers are presumed 
to be some natural resource producers 
mainly in the West, and 
uncompetitive industrial plants 
scattered across the country. Some 
view the agreement as regionally 
biased in favor of the large, service- 
and technology-based firms 
concentrated in the East.
Several Montana industries have 
voiced their strident disapproval of 
the FTA. They support a coalition of 
senators, mainly from the West, who 
have sought to scuttle the deal unless 
the negotiations are revised to deal 
with issues about nonferrous metals, 
coal, plywood, uranium, wheat and 
natural gas. The general criticism is 
that the FTA will have a materially 
damaging effect because it eliminates 
tariffs on imports from Canada but 
allows Canada to keep export 
subsidies in place. Thus, as would-be 
“free traders,” they assert that the 
FTA is flawed because it does not go 
far enough to guarantee “fair trade” 
as measured by the so-called “level 
playing field” (Baucus 1988).
Grain products
Canada shipped nearly 400,000 tons 
of wheat to the United States in 1986, 
nearly all o f it destined for flour mills 
in or near Buffalo, New York. Grain 
growers are concerned that the FTA 
would further open the U.S. border to 
imports of Canadian wheat by 
abolishing the $.21 per bushel tariff. 
Meanwhile, Canada’s import licensing 
system that effectively bans any 
shipment of U.S. wheat into Canada 
would stay in place.
While Canada’s exports do not 
compete directly with Montana grain 
(over 80 percent of which is shipped
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to Asian markets) the fear is that 
these increases in Canadian exports 
would shift North Dakota wheat from 
the eastern to the Pacific market and 
therefore put indirect pressure on 
Montana producers. There is also a 
concern that Canadian grain growers 
might somehow take advantage of the 
U.S. Export Enhancement Program 
incentives to include their wheat in 
shipments to other countries.
The grain growers’ main argument 
is that the FTA does nothing about 
Canadian “Crow rate” rail freight 
subsidies that give their Alberta and 
Saskatchewan competitors an edge in 
shipping eastward. In 1984, a phase­
out program was initiated that shifted 
the financial benefits from growers to 
the railroads to ensure their viability 
and mandated a number of long- 
overdue technical improvements. Still, 
American farmers complain that even 
under the new formula, Canadian 
competitors enjoy an advantage that 
amounts to as much as one-quarter of 
the world price of wheat (National 
Association of Wheat Growers 1987).
These arguments mix fact with 
supposition. The fear about disrupting 
the wheat market may not be well- 
founded. New York purchasers of 
Canadian wheat have claimed that 
their decisions are based on quality as 
well as price. Moreover, there may be 
alternative markets for North Dakota 
wheat, because the Export 
Enhancement Program supports 
shipments to a growing number of 
less-developed countries in Africa,
Asia and Latin America. In short, the 
anticipated increase in Canadian 
wheat exports may not materialize, 
and even if it does, the impact on 
Montana wheat growers could be 
negligible. Furthermore, the 
agreement would allow the United 
States to reimpose tariffs in the event 
that import surges severely disrupted 
domestic markets.
The appearance of unfairness in 
rail subsidies and in Canada’s 
maintenance of restrictive import 
licensing for wheat also hinges on the 
measurement and definition of 
subsidies. Canada is obligated to 
remove the trade barrier if and when 
support for U.S. wheat growers is the
same as in Canada. A complex 
formula was used to calculate the 
value of various government support 
programs in both countries, including 
Canada’s railway subsidies for grain. 
The results show that U.S. wheat 
producers currently enjoy substantial 
advantages. Recent USDA figures 
support this conclusion; they indicate 
American subsidies are over twice as 
large as Canadian ones (Stokes 1987).
Wheat producers who are unhappy 
with some terms of the agreement 
tend to ignore others. The FTA would 
establish a binational team to work 
toward closer harmony in support 
levels and thereby allow for future 
reciprocity in global wheat trade. This 
provision is arguably far more 
important to Montana’s grain industry 
than those concerning cross-border 
wheat trade. Enormously costly 
subsidy wars between the world’s grain 
exporting giants are already straining 
federal treasuries and undermining 
the future of Montana agriculture. 
Joint action by the United States and 
Canada to bring about the worldwide 
abandonment of agricultural export 
subsidies is in the Montana farmer’s 
best interest (Allen 1987).
The Asarco smelter at East 
Helena
Officials at the East Helena smelter 
are concerned that the FTA’s 
elimination of tariffs on Canadian 
imports would threaten the operation’s 
economic viability. Mines in Idaho 
that are located nearer a Canadian 
smelter at Trail, British Columbia, 
would no longer have a price 
incentive to ship their ores to 
Montana. The Lucky Friday mine, for 
example, has contracted to divert a 
portion of its output to Trail in 1988.
There is no doubt that the 
shutdown of the plant would be a 
blow to Lewis and Clark County and 
the city of East Helena. The company 
has reminded state officials in recent 
months that the smelter employs 
approximately 350 workers and pays 
nearly SI million in local property 
taxes. The question is whether such a 
closure would result sooner from 
market conditions than from
Canadian competition. Under the 
FTA, Asarco would have ten years in 
which to adjust to the phased removal 
of the tariff that is only a modest 3 
percent.
Asarco’s main concern is with 
subsidization. The Canadian 
government provides direct and 
indirect support to the minerals 
extraction industries through the 
operation of publicly-owned “Crown” 
corporations and through various 
grant, loan, and loan guarantee 
programs for private firms. The Non- 
Ferrous Metals Producers Committee, 
including Asarco, has argued that 
federal and provincial subsidies 
constitute “perhaps the most serious 
inequity in U.S.-Canadian trade 
relations.” The committee opposes the 
FTA on the grounds that “it will 
ultimately lead to a significant 
competitive advantage for the 
Canadian producers” (Muth 1988).
While it is true that total subsidy 
payments to the Canadian smelter 
amount to $135 million, over half 
take the form of equity investments 
made by the Federal Business 
Development Bank. The rest come 
mainly from provincial and pollution 
control programs, but in no instance 
are the subsidies direct grants, as has 
been alleged. At the same time, 
Asarco’s annual report for 1986 shows 
that the company owes $37 million to 
Lewis and Clark County for pollution 
control bonds, generally considered a 
subsidy because of the deferred 
payments and below-market interest 
rates involved. United States trade 
officials are justifiably circumspect 
about crying foul until U.S. subsidies, 
many of which are hidden by complex 
formulas and technical jargon, are 
identified for the purpose of side-by- 
side comparison.
The FTA calls for a five- to seven- 
year period during which a binational 
team of experts will try to find some 
means of reconciling disparate 
methods of providing public support 
to a wide variety of private industries 
in the two countries. This allows for 
the subsidy question to be resolved 
prior to the complete removal of 
tariffs in ten years. In the meantime, 
the FTA does not preclude Asarco
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from using U.S. trade laws to combat 
allegedly unfair subsidies given to 
Canadian smelters, such as assistance 
to reduce acid rain. Also, East Helena 
may prove a potential case for 
deserved federal adjustment assistance 
if the U.S.-Canada agreement does in 
fact lead to production curtailments, 
lay-offs, or even closure. There are 
also other important questions about 
the long-term viability of lead 
smelting in Montana — including 
supply and demand factors, worker 
health regulations, and corporate 
strategy — that require additional 
research and analysis.
Plywood
The FT A would remove the 20 
percent U.S. duty and the 15 percent 
Canadian duty on imported plywood. 
United States plywood manufacturers 
want the agreement to go one step 
further, to require a change in the 
Canadian standards that restrict the 
importation of U.S.-made plywood.
The American Plywood Association 
argues that restrictive building codes 
effectively prevent 80 percent of U.S. 
plywood from being sold in Canada. 
The removal o f tariffs, therefore, will 
only help Canadian producers to 
increase their share of U.S. markets.
The British Columbia Council of 
Forest Industries argues that Canadian 
plywood, using indigenous species and 
different veneers, is of much higher 
quality than American, and that the 
construction standards reflect this 
qualitative difference. United States 
producers claim that American CDX 
plywood is as good as any in Canada 
and that its use in Alaska belies 
Canada’s assertion that the American 
product does not stand up to cold 
weather. Because most other countries 
accept U.S. plywood standards as 
reliable trademarks, the Canadian 
barrier is patently discriminatory 
(American Plywood Association 1988).
Federal negotiators tried to fashion 
a compromise on this issue by 
requiring the Canada Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation (similar to the 
U.S. FHA) to evaluate American 
plywood. In March, the CMHC 
rejected the U.S. product on the basis 
that lower production standards created
an unacceptable risk of delamination 
(a problem separate from that of cold 
weather durability). The U.S. industry 
now has the option of asking the 
Canadian decision to be reviewed by 
an investigative panel. If such a 
review is requested, the panel would 
have to complete its review by January 
1, 1989. The American Plywood 
Association will probably urge U.S. 
officials to delay tariff revisions until a 
satisfactory solution is reached 
(Bureau of National Affairs 1988).
Whether the FTA would result in 
any injury to Montana plywood 
production is unknown. Champion 
International, after all, operates wood 
products manufacturing plants in 
both countries. In 1986, nearly $7 
million worth of plywood, paperboard 
and related manufactured wood 
products were shipped to Canada 
from Montana (Statistics Canada). It 
makes sense that this volume would 
increase with the removal of the 
tariffs, even if the building codes 
remain in place.
Energy resources: coal, 
uranium, and natural gas
Coal producers are concerned that the 
FTA affords them no protection 
against competition from new 
Canadian power projects. One 
allegation is that Canada does not 
require equivalent pollution control 
on thermal plants; the second is that 
the provinces provide a variety of 
subsidies to hydropower projects that 
encourage dumping in U.S. markets. 
In reality, Canada produces very little 
electricity from coal and exports none 
of it. Further, Canada’s treatment of 
hydropower is very similar to the way 
in which the U.S. government 
developed the TVA and the Columbia 
River: Canada simply enjoys the 
advantage of more numerous sites 
suitable for development.
Rather than seeking the so-called 
“level playing field” in electricity, 
some producers in the United States 
sought to use the FTA negotiations to 
retain markets likely to be lost to 
comparative advantage in Canada.
The U.S. succeeded in maintaining 
the status quo in the Pacific 
Northwest where the Bonneville Power
Administration can control access to 
the California tieline as a way to 
restrict imports from B.C. Hydro.
Coal companies did not achieve, 
however, their goal of putting controls 
on the midwestem electricity market 
that is already a model of unrestricted 
trade.
Uranium and natural gas are 
similar cases. American producers 
face competition from Canada’s more 
favorable production conditions. 
Larger and higher-quality deposits of 
some minerals, for example, are 
classic cases of comparative 
advantage. New Mexico uranium 
interests know that they cannot 
compete with the richer grades of 
Saskatchewan ore without some form 
of trade protection couched in the 
language of national security 
(Haglund 1987). Alberta natural gas 
also has a comparative advantage, 
and some American producers are 
concerned that they will be at a 
disadvantage unless key regulations 
are maintained with the passage of 
the FTA (Coffield).
Montanans who remember the last 
energy crisis (when the state received 
half its gas from Canada) will recall 
that the main concerns in the 1970s 
were availability and reasonable 
prices. It would seem ridiculous today 
to seek to prevent Canada from 
assuring U.S. consumers that they can 
count on supply and fair prices in the 
case of another energy crisis. All 
aspects considered, the single most 
important advantage of the FTA to 
the United States may turn out to be 
the guaranteed access to Canada’s 
energy resources (Netherton 1988).
A political overview
Some of the FTA’s detractors seem to 
ignore the reality that subsidies are a 
two-way street. In one sector after 
another, the trade officials faced 
difficult trade-offs because both 
national economies are so laced with 
direct and indirect subsidies. With 
deadlines looming, the negotiators 
finally backed away from putting all 
subsidies on the table.
If the opponents are successful in 
killing the FTA, in many cases they 
will not have succeeded in addressing
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the real grievances they raise. The 
complications with regulation of 
natural gas will remain. The alleged 
subsidies of hydropower will be 
unchanged. Canada will continue to 
supply smelters with incentives that 
help reduce acid rain. On the other 
hand, passing the FT A does bind 
both sides to a renewed examination 
of which subsidies should be 
considered fair and foul in the debate 
over trade distortion. The two 
countries can hardly be expected to 
take the more difficult second step 
until they have taken the first one— 
the adoption of the FT A as a 
framework for ongoing talks.
A coalition of senators wants the 
agreement renegotiated to address the 
specific concerns of the industries that 
are vulnerable to changes in the world 
market. This demand is unrealistic 
since the senators know fully well that 
it violates the procedure Congress 
agreed to under the “fast-track” 
legislation. Once signed, the 
agreement is a package. If one side 
promotes “clawbacks” into the 
agreement (Rose 1987), the other will 
be forced to counterattack and the 
entire package could come undone. 
That is one reason why U.S. trade law 
separates executive branch 
negotiations from the inherent 
pressures for log-rolling in Congress.
If the “level-playing field” objectors 
are really serious about achieving free 
trade, they should welcome the 
provision in the agreement calling for 
further negotiations to mutually 
eliminate the subsidies that are out of 
bounds.
The Challenge of Economic 
Diversification
Economist Peter Drucker argues that the resource sector has been 
separated from the industrial sector in 
the world economy; the demand for 
raw materials is on a downward 
curve. The most pressing problems 
with many agricultural and mineral 
industries result from global 
competition, and retaining a share of 
shrinking markets is a daunting 
prospect. Attacking the U.S.-Canada 
FTA is largely an assault on
symptoms, not causes of economic 
distress. Protecting jobs from import 
competition in these sectors is likely 
only to shift the burden to others. 
Drucker advises that “a country, an 
industry or a company that puts the 
preservation of ... jobs ahead of 
international competitiveness will soon 
have neither production nor jobs” 
(Drucker 1986). In this paradigm, if 
the Montana economy fails to make 
the transition then it is destined to 
decline.
There are many opportunities 
under the FTA for expanding value- 
added sectors. These are some of the 
possible areas in which 
entrepreneurial firms in Montana 
might find a niche for their products 
and services if Canadian tariffs are 
removed:
• medical technology
• specialized food products
• athletic apparel and outdoor 
recreation equipment
• chemical and pharmaceutical 
products
• water quality, treatment, 
storage methods and machinery
• pollution abatement techniques
• oil and gas exploration 
equipment
• plant genetics and biotechnology
• computer applications to farming 
and ranching
• waste and byproducts recycling
The Montana economy should not 
rely only on commodities that 
originate within the boundaries of the 
state. The emphasis should be on 
adding value, whether it is adding 
value to Montana resource 
commodities or combining Montana 
talent with imported goods that are 
re-exported. Efforts are already 
underway in this direction, but more 
work is needed. The FTA is one way 
to invigorate these efforts.
Tourism is also a growth industry 
enhanced by the FTA. Tourism is a 
relatively recession-proof industry in 
Montana, and Canadian visitors play 
an important role in sustaining the 
park facilities, hotels, restaurants, and 
other travel-related businesses. In 
1985, for example, more than 400,000
Canadians came to Montana and 
spent over $32 million (Montana 
Promotion Division 1987). There 
appears to be a sort of minimum 
threshold for Canada’s contribution to 
Montana’s tourist economy. Federal 
Reserve Bank figures for the last five 
years show, for example, that even 
when the U.S. dollar is highly 
overvalued there is a reliable stream 
of visitors from north of the border. 
Two major factors help explain this 
pattern. First, Montana is the only 
direct “land bridge” for residents of 
Alberta traveling to the United States. 
The Albertan penchant for sunnier, 
warmer climes in the winter months, 
as well as many family ties across the 
border, are a constant stimulus. 
Second, higher relative prices in 
Canada for gasoline, lodging, 
restaurant food and entertainment 
help to offset the unfavorable 
exchange rate.
The FTA does not address currency 
values. Freer trade, however, is likely 
to bring the U.S. and Canadian 
dollars into closer harmony over the 
long run. The Canadian dollar has 
appreciated significantly in recent 
months, and although this trend 
cannot be directly attributed to the 
prospective trade agreement, it 
nevertheless bodes well for Montana’s 
Canadian tourist connections. Even 
without free trade, Canada is key to 
the state’s travel industry expansion. 
The joint tourism promotion efforts of 
Montana and Alberta officials, 
emphasizing the “two-nation vacation” 
theme in foreign markets, is evidence 
of a growing sense of 
interdependence.
Conclusion
As with any deal between willing 
partners, both sides are better off 
under the free trade agreement than 
without it. Within each country, the 
benefits and risks are not shared 
uniformly across all sectors. But care 
has been taken to ensure that no one 
region or industry is forced to carry 
the burden of the agreement. The 
changes rendered by the FTA are 
implemented in stages. Many 
safeguards are included to restore 
equilibrium if certain trade-sensitive 
sectors suffer unanticipated harm.
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The ten-year tariff reduction schedule 
gives affected industries time to adjust 
to new competition. Some provisions 
can be abrogated through the 
unilateral action of either country if 
there is an unwarranted surge of 
exports. Finally, either nation can 
terminate the agreement with only six 
months’ notice and it is automatically 
repealed if the two nations fail to find 
a definitive method of dispute 
resolution in the seventh year.
This cautious approach means that 
the free trade agreement is neither the 
salvation nor the bane of either 
economy, but it does promise to 
stimulate growth in each. Americans 
and Canadians alike will be able to 
purchase less expensive goods in the 
neighboring country while overseas 
imports are still subject to tariffs. 
Canadian producers gain more 
assured access to a larger market; 
American producers gain because 
Canadian tariffs are about twice as 
high as those in the United States.
For Montana, free trade is no 
panacea for economic difficulties and 
the benefits cannot be distributed 
equally in all sectors of the state 
economy. There will be adjustment 
costs to some traditional producers.
On the other hand, many Montanans 
will gain from the agreement. In 
addition to the consumers who receive 
lower prices and a greater variety of 
goods and services to choose from, the 
beneficiaries include aspiring 
entrepreneurs in the value-added 
industries that are the primary target 
of economic diversification programs 
in the state. They also include many 
traditional producers who conveniently 
forget that they have an interest in 
lower input costs, like wheat farmers 
who benefit from unregulated border 
oil prices and inexpensive fertilizer 
from Saskatchewan. They include all 
Montanans of the future, who will 
gain through the FTA a right to share 
Alberta’s energy resources in the event 
of an oil crisis.
On balance, the risks to the 
Montana economy do not appear to 
outweigh the gains of going forward 
with the free trade agreement with 
Canada. The FTA provides an 
important way to invigorate the value- 
added sectors in Montana. If Peter 
Drucker is correct, and the demand 
for raw materials is on a downward 
curve, the Montana economy must 
choose to diversify if it is to survive. CD
This article is a summary o f an 
extensive analysis o f the U.S.-Canada 
free trade agreement. The fu ll report 
is available in June from the 49th 
Parallel Institute, Montana State 
University. The authors would like to 
acknowledge the Northwest Area 
Foundation o f St. Paul, Minnesota 
that provided the assistance for 
research over a two-year period.
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Why do we have a bad faithliability problem in Montana? 
Many are eager to place blame with 
attorneys, while others quickly accuse 
jurors of being too eager to dip into 
the pockets of employers, bankers, or 
insurance companies. Still others focus 
attention upon the state legislature 
and feel that it has attempted to over­
regulate our lives. Almost unnoticed 
in the hullabaloo, however, has been 
the role played by the courts, 
particularly the Montana Supreme 
Court. The Montana Supreme Court 
has, without reservation, adopted the 
concept of bad faith, a novel legal 
theory that lies at the heart of the 
liability debate that exists in Montana 
today.
The Montana courts have been at 
the nation’s forefront in the 
development and application of the 
concept of bad faith. Few states, if 
any, have gone as far as Montana.
As an example, let’s take a look at 
the area of employment law. Let’s 
assume that an employer has workers 
in both Idaho and Montana. Our 
employer has just decided to 
terminate an employee in Montana, 
and also terminate one of his Idaho 
employees. The reason the employer 
gives for the terminations is that the 
work simply has not met the
employer’s expectations. Neither of 
the workers had fixed-term 
employment contracts. Both 
employees were hired under what is 
known as an employment-at-will 
arrangement. Employment-at-will 
simply means there is no fixed 
employment term; the employer or 
employee can terminate the 
relationship at any time, that is, at 
will.
Let us also assume that both 
employees are upset with the 
termination, and decide to pursue 
legal action. The result of the Idaho 
litigation will almost certainly be in 
the employer’s favor. To quote a 1986 
Idaho Supreme Court case,
The rule in Idaho, as in most 
states, is that unless an employee 
is hired pursuant to a contract 
which specifies the duration of 
the employment, or limits the 
reasons for which the employee 
may be discharged, the 
employment is at the will of 
either party, and the employer 
may terminate the relationship at 
any time for any reason without 
incurring liability.
The outcome would likely be the 
same in nearly every other state, 
except Montana.
The result of the Montana litigation 
may well be totally different. Our 
employee will almost certainly allege 
that the employer was guilty of bad 
faith and may receive not only 
compensatory damages for lost wages 
but also punitive damages of perhaps 
a million dollars or more.
The Montana court has decided 
that all contracts including 
employment contracts contain an 
implied obligation of good faith. That 
would not create a serious problem if 
it were not for the fact that the court 
has declared that a lack of good faith 
can be established by mere 
“unreasonable” conduct or by conduct 
which fails to meet “the justifiable 
expectations of the other party.”
Thus, a jury may get to review any 
contracts to determine whether the 
actions were unreasonable or contrary 
to the other party’s expectations.
Cases where the jury finds a lack of 
good faith, are generally known as 
bad faith cases.
The truly radical legal change came 
when the court decided that bad faith 
is not just a contract matter, but is 
also a tort. With that decision, the
court put bad faith cases in the same 
basket as the tort theories of fraud, 
libel, assault, and battery. As a result, 
juries can award not only 
compensatory damages for breach of 
contract but may also assess punitive 
damages designed to punish the 
aggrieving party if the tort of bad 
faith is involved.
Because of the court’s extremely 
liberal definition of good faith, the 
charge of bad faith and the resultant 
claim for punitive damages have now 
become a standard factor in nearly all 
contract disputes.
In most states today (and in 
Montana, up until several years ago) 
breach of contract and tort lawsuits 
are distinctly separate. In a contract 
matter, it is assumed by the courts 
that a party has the right to breach a 
contract if the breaching party is 
willing to compensate the other party 
for actual damages. Those damages 
are known as compensatory damages 
and are designed to make the 
aggrieved party whole. Normally the 
jury is not allowed to punish the 
breaching party by awarding punitive 
damages. The jury’s role is restricted 
to awarding compensatory damages in 
a breach of contract action to 
compensate the aggrieved party for 
actual damages incurred.
The issue of punitive damages 
simply does not arise, in most states, 
unless the matter involves an 
intentional tort such as libel, slander, 
assault, battery or fraud. Unlike 
compensatory damages, punitive 
damages are designed to actually 
punish a party for having 
intentionally committed a grievous 
act. Punitive damages are designed to 
make an example of the other party, 
and are often known as exemplary 
damages. While a jury’s award of 
compensatory damages can be 
measured against an actual loss 
incurred, juries have nearly unbridled 
freedom to determine the amount of 
punitive damages, and as a result, 
multi-million dollar punitive damage 
awards are not uncommon. In 
Montana, this clear distinction 
between contract and tort theory has 
been eroded because of Montana 
court decisions. As a result, what used 
to be simple breach of contract 
matters have now mushroomed into 
complex actions involving the ominous 
theories of bad faith and punitive 
damages.
The development of bad faith as a
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tort concept in Montana had its origin 
in insurance cases. For the past twenty 
years, Montana courts have expressed 
concern about insurance companies 
dragging their feet when settling 
claims. Through a series of cases, the 
Montana courts attempted to 
encourage insurance companies to 
settle fairly and promptly by holding 
that every contract contains an 
implied promise or covenant of good 
faith.
Although the Montana courts have 
not clearly defined bad faith, the 
courts have indicated that bad faith 
may be found in situations where a 
contracting party’s behavior is 
malicious or oppressive. In recent 
cases, however, the Montana Supreme 
Court has extended the application of 
bad faith to cases involving merely 
unreasonable behavior by a 
contracting party. In a 1986 case, the 
Montana Supreme Court stated, “In a 
commercial setting we now have held 
that where the conduct of one party 
unreasonably breaches the justifiable 
expectations of the other party, an 
action in tort results.”
The Montana Supreme Court failed 
to provide a definitive standard or test 
for determining what is bad faith.
This has not, however, prevented the 
court from applying the concept of 
bad faith to a wide variety of 
commercial transactions.
Bad faith in Montana banking 
cases
The banking industry, in particular, has had its practices 
subjected to close scrutiny by the 
Montana Supreme Court through the 
application of the bad faith concept. 
One of the earliest banking bad faith 
cases was the 1984 First National 
Bank in Libby v. Twombly case. In 
that case a First National Bank officer 
made a $3,500 loan to the Twomblys 
for the purchase of an ice machine. 
The Twomblys expected to use the ice 
machine in a restaurant they hoped to 
open. When the negotiations for the 
purchase of a restaurant failed, the 
Twomblys experienced financial 
difficulties. They approached an 
officer of the bank who agreed to
extend the payment date on the loan. 
Another officer of the bank, who was 
not aware of the bank’s agreement to 
extend the loan, called the loan due 
and offset the Twomblys’ checking 
account, leaving them with a balance 
of only $1.65. The bank then sued 
the Twomblys to recover the balance 
owing on the loan. The Twomblys 
counter-claimed against the bank for 
bad faith. The Montana Supreme 
Court held that the bank was liable 
for bad faith and held the bank 
responsible for punitive damages.
In 1985, the Montana Supreme 
Court upheld another bad faith case 
against a bank. The Tribby v. 
Northwestern Bank o f Great Falls case 
involved a jury award of $120,000 
compensatory damages and $1 million 
punitive damages. Tribby and a 
relative were involved in a commercial 
real estate venture. They had their 
joint checking account at Norwest 
Bank. The checking account contract 
required signatures of both parties on 
all checks. Tribby found, however, 
that checks were being honored by the 
bank without his signature. After 
failing to resolve this problem with 
the bank, Tribby filed suit against 
Norwest. Norwest responded by 
placing Tribby’s outstanding loan on 
a “watch list” and refused to renew a 
loan that had been renewed annually 
for several years. Norwest Bank also 
cancelled Tribby’s Ready-Reserve 
Account that had allowed Tribby to 
write checks exceeding the balance in 
his checking account. Although the 
matter was eventually remanded for 
retrial at the district court level due 
to improper jury selection, the 
Montana Supreme Court held that 
this set of facts did merit the 
application of the bad faith concept. 
The court stated, “We hold only that 
the district court, under these 
circumstances, did not err when it 
instructed the jury to consider 
recovery under tort principles and, 
accordingly, punitive damages.”
In a 1987 case, Crystal Springs 
Trout Co. v. First State Bank of 
Froid, the Montana Supreme Court 
upheld an $800,000 judgment against 
a bank officer, Jerry Wolinder, who 
was unable to carry through on a
promised extension of credit to the 
trout farm. Wolinder had represented 
that his bank would have “no 
problem” obtaining sufficient 
financing for the trout farm 
operation. Wolinder was, however, 
unable to obtain the promised 
financing and the trout farm 
floundered. The court affirmed the 
damage award against Wolinder 
based on a lack of good faith.
There have been numerous other 
cases in Montana involving bank 
practices and the concept of bad 
faith. Bankers frequently find 
themselves subject to litigation 
involving customer complaints where 
the bank has failed to extend credit 
that was impliedly promised or merely 
expected, or where they have 
“unreasonably” called loans due.
There have also been suits brought 
against banks alleging that banks have 
loaned too much money to borrowers, 
and that the banks should have 
known that the borrowers would not 
be in a sufficient financial position to 
repay the loans.
Bad faith in wrongful discharge 
cases
Another area that has evolved very rapidly in Montana is the 
wrongful discharge of employees. The 
Montana Supreme Court has implied 
a covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in the employment context 
and has treated the breach of this as 
a tort with the resultant punitive 
damages.
Historically, employers could 
discharge employees without cause. 
This doctrine, referred to as the at- 
will doctrine, has remained relatively 
intact in all but a few states. The 
Montana Supreme Court has gone 
farther than any other court in 
abolishing the employment-at-will 
concept.
In 1983 in Gates v. Life o f 
Montana Insurance Co., the Montana 
Supreme Court first established the 
requirement that employers deal in 
good faith with their employees. Gates 
was working under an oral contract 
with no stated term and was 
thereafter terminated without
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warning. The court concluded that 
the company’s dismissal of Gates 
might violate an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. The case 
was remanded to a lower court for 
determination of whether the dismissal 
was in bad faith.
In a 1984 case, Adair v. Montana 
Petroleum Marketing Co., the 
Montana Supreme Court gave some 
clarity to the issue of when the 
implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing would arise in the 
employment setting. The court held 
that the covenant of good faith 
existed whenever there were “objective 
manifestations by the employer giving 
rise to the employee’s reasonable 
belief that he or she has job security 
and will be treated fairly.” Although 
the Adair case did not clearly define 
what constituted a lack of good faith, 
it should put employers on notice that 
destroying an employee’s expectations 
of continued employment may 
constitute bad faith and subject the 
employer to punitive damages.
In 1986, the Montana Supreme 
Court upheld an award of $1.3 
million in punitive damages in the 
case of Flanigan v. Prudential Federal 
Savings and Loan Association. Mrs. 
Flanigan had been an employee for 
approximately thirty years and was 
terminated from her position as loan 
counselor based on an alleged 
reduction in work force. The bank 
president’s testimony that referred to 
Mrs. Flanigan as “ballast” did not 
help Prudential’s position. The 
Montana Supreme Court held that the 
jury could have inferred malice from 
Prudential’s actions and that malice 
could support an award of punitive 
damages. The Flanigan case should 
again be a reminder to employers that 
they may be held liable for punitive 
damages by disgruntled employees 
who feel that their employers’ actions 
are unreasonable and thus constitute 
bad faith.
Perhaps the most controversial 
Montana bad faith case was a 1986 
case from Butte, Dunfee v. Baskin- 
Robbins, Inc. In this case Terrence 
and Patricia Dunfee purchased a 
Baskin and Robbins franchise 
operation. The purchase price of 
$71,000 was funded with an Small
Business Administration (SBA) 
guaranteed loan. The franchise 
operation was already located in the 
Raymond Mini-Mall. The operation 
was quite successful for a ten-month 
period, at which time the 
configuration of the mall’s parking lot 
was rearranged. The change in the 
parking lot resulted in decreased 
traffic, and the Dunfees desired to 
move the operation to a larger mall, 
the Butte Plaza. They contacted the 
district manager of Baskin and 
Robbins, Sharon McCarthy. She 
informed the Dunfees that the 
franchise could not be moved to 
another mall because of stipulations 
in the existing lease. McCarthy did 
not, however, contact the appropriate 
Baskin-Robbins vice president to 
ascertain whether the vice president 
would approve such a move.
McCarthy also failed to tell the 
Dunfees that the existing lease had 
both a subleasing provision and a 
right to terminate after five years.
The Dunfees were under the 
mistaken impression that the lease 
could not be terminated for a fifteen- 
year period. The operation eventually 
failed and the SBA foreclosed on the 
assets.
The Dunfees then brought the 
action against Baskin and Robbins, 
alleging bad faith. The jury agreed 
with the Dunfees allegation and 
awarded the Dunfees $300,000 in 
punitive damages in addition to 
$230,000 in compensatory damages. 
Mrs. Dunfee testified that she had 
become distraught when the operation 
failed and that she had lost her self­
esteem. Mrs. Dunfee testified also that 
she tried to avoid going back into 
Butte where she felt ashamed for 
being recognized as a failure. The 
jury recognized this as emotional 
distress, and awarded Mrs. Dunfee an 
additional $150,000 to compensate 
her for mental and emotional distress. 
The Montana Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court judgment, 
although it is important to note that 
the decision was a four-to-three 
decision, and that one of the members 
of the majority, Justice Morrison, is 
no longer a member of the court.
Other applications
The impact of the bad faith concept on a wide variety of different 
transactions cannot be overestimated. 
The insurance industry, for example, 
has been struck by both edges of the 
sword. Insurance companies find that 
they are faced with raising premiums 
due to the increased risk that 
businesses face from bad faith claims; 
at the same time, insurance 
companies are having to pay claims at 
an accelerated rate because of their 
potential bad faith liability for not 
promptly settling claims.
Surprisingly, pricing decisions by 
businesses may also be subjected to 
the bad faith concept. Recent court 
cases in Oregon and California ruled 
that banks’ charges for insufficient 
funds checks must be set in good 
faith. Those courts held that banks’ 
service charges for insufficient funds 
checks amounted to contracts of 
adhesion because there was little 
bargaining power between the 
customer and the banks. In those 
situations the courts held that the 
banks, being in a superior bargaining 
position, owed an obligation of good 
faith to the customers when setting 
those service charges. As a result, the 
banks have been subjected to class 
action suits for up to $30 million. The 
banks lost both of those court cases 
and review was denied by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
If the Montana courts follow the 
same line of reasoning and apply the 
bad faith concept to the pricing 
decisions of Montana businesses, the 
result could be momentous for a 
variety of businesses. Not only banks, 
but hospitals, title companies, 
insurance companies, gasoline 
distributors, and a variety of 
professionals such as doctors, lawyers, 
stockbrokers, accountants and real 
estate brokers could be faced with 
price-setting bad faith claims. 
According to the court decisions in 
California and Oregon, there appears 
to be no way around the charge of 
bad faith unless the businesses can 
show that the individual charges 
reasonably reflect the actual cost of 
the service and that individual 
customers are presented with a
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meaningful opportunity to negotiate. 
The results of these tort cases could 
dramatically change the way many 
businesses handle their relationships 
with their individual customers.
Constitutional background
Perhaps the primary reason for the lack of legislative response to the 
bad faith issue has been a provision in 
the Montana Constitution, which 
specifies that each injured individual 
is entitled to full redress for any 
injury. Prior to the last legislative 
session, a variety of factions 
successfully proposed Constitutional 
Initiative 30 (CI-30), which specified 
that the legislature has the authority 
to limit the amount of recovery by 
injured individuals. CI-30 was passed 
by the voters, and the Montana 
legislature did enact a number of 
“tort reform” measures in the last 
session.
For instance, in the area of 
employee discharge, the legislature 
almost completely abolished the 
recovery of punitive damages by an 
aggrieved employee. According to the 
new legislation, an employee who wins 
in court will likely recover only 
compensatory damages. In effect, this 
legislation attempted to take the bite 
out of employee discharge bad faith 
cases.
The legislature also addressed the 
issue of the liability of corporate 
boards of directors. Increasingly, 
board members have found themselves 
subjected to suits brought against 
them by shareholders alleging that 
board members were negligent or 
careless in performing their duties. Of 
course, these lawsuits are most 
common in situations where the 
corporation is not as profitable as 
expected. The legislature attempted to 
deal with this problem by providing 
that corporations may, by shareholder 
vote, amend their articles of 
incorporation to provide that board 
members will be liable only for 
intentional actions that harm the 
corporation, but will not be liable to 
shareholders for mere negligence. This 
change may make it easier for 
corporations to obtain liability
insurance for their board members, as 
well as to attract new board members. 
It should be noted, however, that this 
change applies only to those 
corporations whose shareholders vote 
to so amend their articles of 
incorporation.
Much of the hope for resolving the 
bad faith issue rested upon bills 
introduced in the last session to 
change the Montana Supreme Court’s 
definition of bad faith. Those bills 
were very controversial, and the result 
appears to be that the legislature has 
simply codified the Supreme Court’s 
liberal bad faith definition. Rather 
than greatly limiting the situations 
where bad faith can apply, the 
Montana legislature specified by 
statute that bad faith actions can arise 
from any situation involving either a 
lack of honesty in fact or a failure to 
observe reasonable commercial 
standards. No doubt, the murky issue 
of reasonable commercial standards 
will arise many times in future 
litigation.
Not long after the legislative session 
finished, the Montana Supreme Court 
handed down a decision invalidating 
CI-30 for various technical reasons. 
The court was primarily concerned 
with the process by which the 
initiative had been presented to the 
voters. Now that CI-30 has been 
invalidated, even the limited tort 
reform passed by the last session of 
the legislature is certainly suspect. 
Although there have not yet been any 
Montana Supreme Court cases 
invalidating any of the tort reforms 
adopted by the last legislature, there 
have already been a number of 
challenges made in district courts to 
those reforms. It would not be 
unreasonable to expect that the tort 
reforms passed by the legislature will 
meet the same fate as CI-30 when 
they get before the Montana Supreme 
Court.
The outlook
Because of what happened toCI-30, we are again faced with a 
great deal of uncertainty. Another 
version of CI-30 may be proposed to 
the voters. Some argue that all of the 
tort reforms passed by the last session 
of the legislature will need to be 
readopted by a future legislature if 
the constitution is successfully 
amended.
Another factor to consider is the 
makeup of the Montana Supreme 
Court. Now that Frank Morrison, 
author of some of the most far- 
reaching bad faith decisions, has 
resigned from the court to run for 
governor, court observers are waiting 
to see if the next series of bad faith 
cases take a different direction.
Montana businesses now face 
greater uncertainty than ever. Because 
of doubt about the future direction of 
the Montana Supreme Court, doubt 
about the extent or availability of 
insurance coverage, and doubt about 
the applicability of the tort reforms 
passed by the last Montana 
legislature, businesses need to be ever 
more aware of their potential liability 
in the area of bad faith. □
Jerry Fumiss is an assistant professor 
and Jack Morton is a professor in the 
University o f Montana’s Department 
o f Management. They are both 
attorneys.
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R e v i s e d
County Data Packages
N o w  A v a i l a b l e
County Data Packages — containing pertinent in­
formation about population, households, and 
income — are an essential tool for sensible, 
meaningful economic planning for your business 
or agency. And now the County Data Packages 
have been updated so you’ll have the most 
current county-level information available. In a 
series of data tables, you’ll find:
Population, by age and sex (1980-1986)
Households, by type (1980-1986)
Total personal income, nonfarm labor 
income, property income, transfer pay­
ments, and farm income (1980-1987)
Total personal income, by major compo­
nent, and per capita income (1968-1986)
You can purchase the revised County Data 
Packages individually at $10 per county. County 
Data Packages for all fifty-six counties are 
available for a total of $250.
If you would like to purchase a County Data 
Package, or would like further information, 
please contact the Bureau of Business and 
Economic Research, University of Montana, 
Missoula, 59812, (406) 243-5113.
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The Bureau of Business and Economic Research is the research and 
public service branch of the University of Montana’s School of Business 
Administration.
The Bureau is regularly involved in a wide variety of activities, including 
economic analysis and forecasting, forest products industry research, and 
survey research.
The Bureau’s Economics Montana forecasting system is an effort to 
provide public and private decision makers with reliable forecasts and 
analysis. It is made possible by a generous grant from U.S. West. These 
state and local area forecasts are the focus of the annual series of 
Economic Outlook Seminars, cosponsored by the respective Chambers of 
Commerce in Missoula, Billings, Great Falls, and Helena.
The Bureau also has available county data packages for all Montana 
counties. These packages provide up-to-date economic and demographic 
information developed by the Bureau and not available elsewhere.
The Montana Poll, a quarterly public opinion poll, questions Montanans 
about their views on a variety of economic and social issues. It is 
cosponsored by the Great Falls Tribune. In addition, the Bureau conducts 
contract survey research and offers a random digit dialing program for 
survey organizations in need of random telephone samples.
The Forest Industries Data Collection System, a census of forest industry 
firms conducted approximately every five years, provides a large amount of 
information about raw materials sources and uses in Montana, Idaho, and 
Wyoming. It is funded by the U.S. Forest Service. The Montana Forest 
Industries Information System collects quarterly information on the 
employment and earnings of production workers in the Montana industry. 
It is cosponsored by the Montana Wood Products Association.
Readers of the Montana Business Quarterly are welcome to comment on 
the MBQj request economic data or other Bureau publications, or to 
inquire about the Bureau’s research capabilities.
The Montana Business Quarterly is currently supported by a generous grant from the Burlington Northern 
Foundation, which represents the following Burlington Northern, Inc. subsidiaries: Burlington Northern 
Railroad Company, Glacier Park Company, Meridian Minerals Company, Meridian Oil, Inc., and Plum Creek 
Timber Company, Inc.
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